Litigation Update: Special Parole, TPS and CBP ONE

Litigation and Legal Uncertainty in Special Parole and TPS Programs: An Analysis of the 2025 Developments Affecting CHNV, CBP One Parolees, and Venezuelan TPS Beneficiaries

By Alexander Alfano

In the ever-shifting landscape of United States immigration policy, executive discretion, administrative mechanisms, and judicial review intersect in dynamic and often controversial ways. The year 2025 marked a critical juncture in this interplay with respect to humanitarian programs such as the CHNV parole process, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Venezuelans, and parole authorizations through the CBP One application. Each of these mechanisms represents not only a pathway to temporary relief for vulnerable noncitizens but also a site of constitutional contestation and statutory interpretation. This essay undertakes a detailed examination of recent litigation and administrative developments, situating the changes within a broader doctrinal framework of immigration law, including citations to pertinent statutes, case law, and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).

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I. The CHNV Parole Program: Termination and Judicial Stay

On March 25, 2025, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) formally published a notice in the Federal Register announcing the termination of the special humanitarian parole process for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans—collectively referred to as “CHNV” parole. This program, initiated during the Biden administration, was designed to address mass displacement and border management concerns by offering case-by-case parole into the United States under INA § 212(d)(5)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)].

Shortly after the program’s termination, plaintiffs in Svitlana Doe, et al. v. Noem, et al., No. 25-cv-10495 (D. Mass. Apr. 14, 2025), filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking injunctive relief. The court granted a preliminary injunction that stayed the enforcement of the March 25 termination order. In doing so, the court found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities favored temporary relief.

As a result of this order, DHS’s effort to terminate the CHNV parole for existing recipients has been temporarily suspended. Termination notices already issued to Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan nationals under the Federal Register notice are presently stayed and unenforceable. However, no new CHNV parole requests will be processed during the pendency of the injunction.

From a legal perspective, the dispute raises fundamental questions about agency authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). While INA § 212(d)(5)(A) permits DHS to grant parole “on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” courts have traditionally interpreted this language as granting the executive wide—but not unfettered—discretion. In Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), the Supreme Court upheld the government’s authority to exclude certain Haitian parolees but emphasized that administrative action must be nondiscriminatory and consistent with statutory goals.

Furthermore, the Svitlana Doe litigation potentially implicates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706, particularly in assessing whether the agency engaged in arbitrary and capricious decision-making or failed to observe required procedures. In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983), the Court held that an agency’s reversal of policy must be accompanied by a reasoned explanation. Plaintiffs in the Massachusetts litigation are likely to argue that DHS failed to adequately justify the program’s abrupt termination and did not fully consider reliance interests or humanitarian consequences.

 II. TPS for Venezuelans: Legal Protections in Suspension

Alongside the CHNV litigation, TPS designations for Venezuelan nationals were also subjected to abrupt policy shifts in early 2025. TPS, governed by INA § 244 [8 U.S.C. § 1254a], provides temporary protection from removal for nationals of countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disasters, or extraordinary conditions. DHS had extended TPS to Venezuelans under this provision in 2023, with protections set to expire on April 7, 2025.

However, a federal court issued a stay following a legal challenge to the termination, temporarily halting DHS’s enforcement against those protected under the 2023 TPS designation. The legal basis for such litigation typically involves both procedural and substantive arguments under the APA, as well as equal protection concerns under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

In Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2018), the court found that the Trump administration’s decision to terminate TPS for certain countries was likely motivated by discriminatory animus and therefore unconstitutional. Although the Ninth Circuit later reversed the decision, the case exemplifies the role of federal courts in scrutinizing motivations behind administrative rescissions of humanitarian protection. Plaintiffs in the current TPS litigation may similarly contend that the termination was insufficiently reasoned, failed to account for continuing instability in Venezuela, and unjustly disrupts the lives of TPS holders.

Under 8 C.F.R. § 244.2, TPS recipients are also granted employment authorization and may obtain advance parole for international travel. A court-ordered stay thus preserves not only physical presence but also legal capacity to work and travel. In the broader context, these injunctions reflect the judicial balancing of humanitarian equities against executive prerogatives, a tension that continues to shape the boundaries of administrative discretion in immigration law.

III. CBP One Parolees and the Rise of Removal Proceedings

A more sweeping development came in the form of the Trump administration’s termination of parole status for individuals who entered the United States using the CBP One app—a technological portal created under President Biden to streamline border access for asylum-seekers and parole applicants. Many of these parolees used the app to gain lawful entry under humanitarian parole, often as part of CHNV or asylum-related programs.

Under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5, parole may be granted to noncitizens for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. However, parole is not an admission and does not confer immigration status. It is inherently discretionary and revocable, a fact emphasized by DHS in its termination notices, which instruct parolees either to depart voluntarily or face removal and a re-entry bar.

This revocation raises due process concerns, particularly under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which requires a balancing of the individual’s interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government’s interest. While parolees are technically not “admitted” aliens and thus have fewer constitutional protections (Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)), the mass rescission of parole status without individualized assessment may be challenged as procedurally deficient under the APA.

Moreover, the sudden reclassification of parolees for removal eligibility raises practical and ethical concerns for those who had relied on parole to establish lives in the United States. Children enrolled in schools, workers in lawful employment, and families with U.S. citizen members now face abrupt displacement. DHS’s approach may also be vulnerable to challenge under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which limits the detention of noncitizens where removal is not reasonably foreseeable.

IV. Implications and Legal Forecast

The litigation landscape emerging from the 2025 immigration rollback illustrates the fragile legal architecture of humanitarian protection. Parole, unlike asylum or refugee status, offers no statutory pathway to permanent residence. It depends wholly on executive discretion, as defined under INA § 212(d)(5), and is vulnerable to reversal upon administrative change. The same applies to TPS, which—though created by statute—is contingent on DHS’s continuing designation and may be revoked at any time.

The growing frequency of litigation in this area reflects a larger structural trend: as Congress has failed to enact durable immigration reform, courts have become arbiters of policy reversals executed through executive orders and administrative memoranda. The reliance on litigation as a policy checkpoint underscores the constitutional limits of executive power in immigration and the importance of procedural regularity and transparency in rulemaking.

Critically, the cases reviewed here involve more than abstract legal principles. They directly affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of individuals—many of whom fled violence, political persecution, or economic collapse—by determining whether they can remain in the United States lawfully. The human stakes involved place a premium on accurate statutory interpretation, judicious use of discretion, and robust judicial oversight.

Conclusion

As of mid-2025, the United States is navigating a period of aggressive immigration rollback driven by executive fiat. Programs such as CHNV parole, CBP One access, and Venezuelan TPS have been targeted for termination, sparking judicial interventions aimed at preserving humanitarian protections. The litigation outcomes in Svitlana Doe and the TPS cases highlight the enduring role of federal courts in checking administrative overreach and safeguarding the procedural rights of noncitizens.

Although INA § 212(d)(5) and § 244 vest considerable discretion in the executive branch, that discretion is not immune from judicial scrutiny, especially when abrupt terminations implicate reliance interests, humanitarian need, and constitutional protections. As courts continue to weigh in, the contours of immigration discretion—and the future of temporary humanitarian relief in the United States—will be shaped by the delicate balance of statutory text, equitable concern, and constitutional norm.

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